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In South Carolina State Highway Department v. Rural Land
Co.,1 the Highway Department contended that the assistant
secretary and executive manager of the Buckfield Plantation,
ninety and one half acres of which had been condemned
for the construction of Interstate Highway 95, had been
erroneously allowed to testify as to the value of the condemned
land.2 The department contended that he should not have
been allowed to testify because he was not the owner of the
property nor was he qualified as an expert witness. The
corporate landowner conceded that the mere fact that the
witness was an officer of the corporation would not qualify
him to testify as to the value of the land, but it was shown
that as the manager, he was thoroughly familiar with the
land, its use and its value. The lower court felt that it was
his knowledge, not his position, which qualified him to testify
as to the value of the land. The supreme court, in ruling
the testimony properly admitted, quoted the South Carolina
principle that "[g]enerally, the best available proof of what
land is worth is the opinion of those who know enough of
the factors, which must be a basis of the opinion, to express
their judgment about it. ' 's
II. IMPEACHMENT
A. Impeaching One's Own Witness
In State v. Richburg,4 South Carolina fell in line with the
majority rule that a party calling a witness must be damaged
as well as surprised before he can use a prior inconsistent
statement to impeach his own witness.
In the lower court the defendant was convicted of mur-
dering a deputy sheriff and was sentenced to death. The
1. 250 S.C. 12, 156 S.E.2d 333 (1967).
2. The trial court rendered a verdict of $129,835 in favor of the land-
owner.
3. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Rural Land Co., 250 S.C. 12,
25, 156 S.E.2d 333, 339 (1967); accord, Miller v. Parr Shoals Power Co.,
104 S.C. 129 132-33, 88 S.E. 374, 375 (1916).
4. 158 S.E.2d 769 (S.C. 1968).
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State called as a witness Thomas Lee Johnson who was at
the scene of the gun fight in which the defendant was
wounded and the deputy slain. When on the stand the witness
denied pertinent knowledge of the shooting. While he gave
no testimony which was adverse or damaging to the State's
case, he did not testify as the solicitor had expected on the
basis of a statement which the witness had previously signed.
Had the witness given testimony consistent with his previous
statement, such testimony would have been a key point in
the State's case.
When the witness gave testimony to the effect that he
knew nothing of real importance about the shooting, the
solicitor claimed surprise and was allowed to cross-examine
and impeach his own witness, whom the judge declared to be
hostile. The witness admitted signing the statement but
denied having made substantially all of it as it was read to
him by the solicitor in the presence of the jury. The solicitor
in turn put up witnesses who testified that the written state-
ment had been given by Johnson voluntarily and with ap-
parent understanding.
The supreme court, after assuming that the prosecutor had
adequately shown surprise, concluded that the claimed sur-
prise had not resulted in the giving of any evidence which
was detrimental to the State's case. The court held that
under the facts shown by the record the solicitor should not
have been allowed to cross-examine his own witness, that the
statement which was read in the presence of the jury as a
part of that cross-examination was prejudicial, and that be-
cause of this a new trial was required.
As a general rule a party may not impeach his own wit-
ness, 5 but most courts permit impeachment if two require-
ments are met:
The first is that the party seeking to impeach must
show that he is surprised at the testimony of the
witness. The second is that he cannot impeach un-
less the witness' testimony is positively harmful to
his cause, reaching further than a mere failure ("I
do not remember," "I do not know") to give expected
favorable testimony.
5. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 477 (1957).
6. C. McCoR IcK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 73 (1954).
1968]
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While previous cases have required a showing of surprise
before allowing impeachment of one's own witness,7 the
Richburg case is the first time that the South Carolina Su-
preme Court has required that the calling party be both
surprised and damaged by the testimony before he can use
a prior inconsistent statement to impeach his own witness.$
B. Statement Taken By An Insurance Adjuster
From the standpoint of evidence, probably the most im-
portant point in the case of Powers v. Temple9 was one that
was discussed by the court after it had already decided that
a new trial was necessary. The defendant's cross-examination
of the plaintiff clearly tended to convey to the jury the im-
pression that a written statement, which the plaintiff admit-
ted signing, was contradictory to the testimony which she was
giving on the stand. On re-direct the plaintiff sought to show
the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement
and that the statement had been signed for a Mr. Moody, the
defendant's insurance adjuster, but the trial judge only al-
lowed the plaintiff to show that Mr. Moody was not repre-
senting her interests in taking the statement. The plaintiff
objected to the admission of the statement in evidence unless
she was allowed to prove the identity of Mr. Moody. This
objection was sustained by the trial judge.
The plaintiff conceded and the supreme court affirmed the
general principle that evidence as to liability insurance is
not ordinarily admissible, 10 but it was urged that since the
message had been conveyed to the jury that the statement
was contradictory to the plaintiff's present testimony, she
should have been allowed to show Mr. Moody's interest in
the case and to offer evidence of prejudice on his part
against her in favor of the defendant. The court in Powers
adopted the following rule:
As a general rule, where a previously written state-
ment is produced in court and used for the purpose
of impeaching plaintiff or one of his witnesses, it is
proper for plaintiff's counsel to show that the person
7. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E.2d 72 (1940).
8. J. DREnER, A Gums To EvmnENca LAw IN SOUTH CAROLINA 16 (1967).
9. 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759 (1967). Other aspects of this case are
discussed in the text accompanying note 39 infra.
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procuring such statement was the representative of
the defendant's insurance company."
However, in adopting this rule the court hastened to cau-
tion that it should only be applied where the reason for
the rule exists and the circumstances warrant its application.
The reason for the rule was quoted as follows:
[The statement taker,] though he may never appear
in the court room, is nevertheless, in a sense, vouch-
ing for the accuracy and authenticity of the docu-
ment. He is, as it were, a mute witness, and the jury
has the right to be informed of his interest in the
case when weighing the testimony of the witness
who attacks his handiwork.
12
The court concluded that because of the impression given to
the jury about the statement, the application of the rule
was warranted in this case and that the trial judge should
have allowed the plaintiff "to prove the full circumstances
surrounding the taking of the statement, including the ident-
ity of the taker and his connection with the case."18
In Brave v. Blakely,14 a witness was being questioned
about an allegedly prior inconsistent written statement made
by him. Asked if he had written the statement, he replied,
"I did not. The adjuster wrote the statement, and he asked
me to sign it after he wrote it up." The supreme court
quoted the above general rule' 5 from Powers and held that
the trial judge had properly followed that case in refusing
a motion for a mistrial which was made on the ground that
the mention of the word "adjuster" was an implication of
insurance coverage and thus so prejudicial to the appellant's
case that a mistrial should be ordered.' 6
11. Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 161, 156 S.E.2d 759, 764-65 (1967),
quoting from Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 782 (1949).
12. Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 161, 156 S.E.2d 759, 765 (1967),
quoting from Smith v. Pacific Truck Express, 100 P.2d 474, 479 (Ore.
1940).
13. Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 162, 156 S.E.2d 759, 765 (1967).
14. 250 S.C. 353, 157 S.E.2d 726 (1967).
15. 250 S.C. at 261, 156 S.E.2d at 764-65 (1967).
16. When liability insurance is incidentally mentioned during the course
of a trial, it is within the discretion of the trial judge whether or not a
mistrial should be granted. Vollington v. Southern Paving Constr. Co.,
166 S.C. 448, 165 S.E. 184 (1932). See also J. DREHmE, supra note 8, at 41.
1968]
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C. Impeaching Statement Before it is Offered in Evidence
In Crowder v. Carroll,'7 the trial judge allowed a highway
patrolman to testify to what the son of the defendant had
told him about two hours after the occurrence of the accident
which was the subject of this litigation. The trial judge
ruled that this testimony was admissible as an admission by
a party opponent because the statement of the son, who was
driving the father's automobile at the time of the collision,
was that of an agent under the family purpose doctrine and
could therefore be used against the principal. The supreme
court said that this was obviously erroneous under Marshall v.
Thomason,' which held that a statement given by an agent
truck driver to a patrolman was not admissible as an admis-
sion against his principal.19
The supreme court inferred that the actual reason that the
plaintiff wanted to have the patrolman's testimony admitted
was for the purpose of impeaching a pre-trial statement by
the defendant's son which was to be offered later in the
trial. The court said that, of course, it is not proper to
allow testimony for the purpose of impeaching a witness
who had not at that time testified either in person or by
means of a statement. However, the admission of the testi-
mony at that premature time was held not to be prejudicial
because it could have been properly admitted after the an-
ticipated statement by the defendant's son was in fact ad-
mitted.
D. Collateral Matters
In State v. Ladd,20 a rape case, the mother of the prose-
cutrix denied on cross-examination that she had, only two
months before the trial of the present case, signed a warrant
in another county charging another man with a similar of-
fense against her daughter. After this denial by the mother,
the lower court refused to allow the defense counsel to con-
tinue to cross-examine her on this matter saying that it was
a collateral matter which did not affect the issues on trial.
17. 161 S.E.2d 235 (S.C. 1968).
18. 241 S.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 177 (1962).
19. According to Professor Dreher, the court in Marshall said in effect
that the agent truck driver was hired to drive a truck and not to give state-
ments. J. DRnHER, supra note 8, at 68.




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
EVIDENCE SURVEYED
The supreme court affirmed this decision of the trial judge
as being one peculiarly within his discretion.2'
III. CREDIBiLITY OF WITNESSES
In State v. Richburg,22 the court restated its position that
even though there is no direct evidence to dispute the testi-
mony of a witness, the court is not justified in directing a
verdict if there is anything in the circumstances tending to
create distrust in the truthfulness of the witness, and, that




In Gause v. Livingston,24 an action by a passenger to re-
cover damages for personal injuries suffered in an automobile
accident, the court held that the trial judge had erroneously
admitted testimony which was irrelevant and possibly pre-
judicial to the defendant. The disputed testimony was given
by the mother of the injured passenger, Josephine Gause, to
the effect that Josephine's father had been blind for twenty-
five years, that Josephine was one of six children, and that
the mother was the sole support of Josephine. In holding
that this testimony was not relevant the court restated the
familiar principle that: "It is necessary that the fact shown
by the evidence offered legally tends to prove, or make more
or less probable, some matter in issue and bear directly or
indirectly thereon.1
25
In State v. Bell,26 which was a review of the trial of the
accused slayer of Mrs. Justin Bridges, the wife of a prominent
Laurens County attorney, one of the reversible errors cited
by the supreme court was the admission of testimony by
Chief Strom of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Divi-
sion that the defendant had told him some two and one half
years after the Bridges' murder that "he [the defendant]
had to kill another young white woman; he wanted to bathe
his feet and his head in her blood." The court held that
21. See J. DREHER, supra note 8, at 15.
22. 158 S.E.2d 769 (S.C. 1968).
23. State v. Brown, 205 S.C. 514, 32 S.E.2d 825 (1945); Thompson v.
Bearden, 200 S.C. 519, 21 S.E.2d 189 (1942).
24. 159 S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 1968).
25. Id. at 607.
26. 250 S.C. 37, 156 S.E.2d 313 (1967).
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this inflamatory testimony could only bear on the defendant's
state of mind at the time that he made the statement and
should have been excluded as having no logical relevance to
the murder for which the defendant was on trial.
Descriptions of the victim's mutilated body and evidence
that she had been raped were held properly admitted for
the purpose of showing malice and motive.
B. Out-of-Court Experiments
Unless an out-of-court experiment is performed under cir-
cumstances substantially the same as those of the actual
occurrence, the results are irrelevant to the issue sought to
be proved or disproved.
Weaks v. South Carolina State Highway Department,27 an
action to recover personal damages, was a clear application
of this principle. On the morning of January 20, 1966, Mrs.
Weaks was driving on State Highway 34 at about forty-five
miles per hour when she came over the crest of a hill and
saw her lane of travel blocked by two maintenance trucks
belonging to the Highway Department. At the same time
she observed a car approaching in the other lane of the
highway, thus preventing her from passing the stopped trucks.
She testified that she applied her brakes but was unable to
stop and ran into the rear of one of the trucks. She had
no way of knowing that there were trucks on the highway
until she reached the top of the hill, there being no signs
or signals to warn her of their presence.
A highway patrolman testified, in the absence of the jury,
that he and another patrolman went to the scene of the col-
lision in separate cars after the trial of the case had begun
and conducted an experiment. They parked one of the cars
on the shoulder of the road at the point where they believed
the collision had occurred. The patrolman testified that he
then went down the road, turned around and proceeded to-
ward the point of collision as had Mrs. Weaks. He said that
he came over the top of the hill at fifty-eight miles per hour,
thirteen miles per hour faster than Mrs. Weaks testified that
she had been traveling, and applied his brakes when he saw
the other patrol car. He was able to stop two hundred and
twenty-four feet before he reached the second car.
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The trial judge refused to admit this testimony for con-
sideration by the jury. The supreme court in affirming this
ruling pointed out some of the ways in which the experiment
differed from the conditions existing on the morning of the
collision The patrol car was a 1966 Chevrolet with power
brakes; whereas Mrs. Weaks was driving a 1957 Ford with
standard brakes. The patrolmen in conducting the experi-
ment were not sure exactly where the truck had been parked
on the day of the collision. The most important variant,
however, was the human element. The patrolman not only
knew that he would see the parked car and would have to
stop, but since he had placed the car and driven away from
it, he knew the point at which he would see the car and
would have to apply his brakes. Mrs. Weaks, on the other
hand, was totally unaware of the danger which awaited her.
She did not know of the presence of the trucks on the highway
until she crested the hill and even then she did not im-
mediately perceive that they were completely stopped. At
the same time that Mrs. Weaks was faced with this sudden
emergency she was also confronted with the vehicle approach-
ing from the opposite direction, an additional factor with
which the patrolman did not have to cope.
The rule which our court has followed in determining the
admissibility of testimony about out-of-court experiments is
that the conditions and circumstances under which the ex-
periment is conducted must be substantially similar to those
existing at the time of the occurrence involved in the con-
troversy.28 The conditions do not have to be identical; minor
variations in the essential conditions should go to the weight,
rather than to the admissibility, of the evidence.2 The court
had no trouble in holding that the circumstances of the pa-
trolmen's experiment were not substantially similar to those
surrounding Mrs. Weaks at the time of the collision.
V. WRITINGS
A. Best Evidence
In South Carolina and generally, loss or destruction of
the original writing has long been an excuse for its non-
28. Id.; McDowell v. Floyd, 240 S.C. 158, 125 S.E.2d 4 (1963); Beasley
v. Ford Motor Co., 237 S.C. 506, 117 S.E.2d 863 (1961).
29. See 29 AM. JuR. 2d Evidence § 824 (1967).
1968] 583
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production, even when the best evidence rule is clearly ap-
plicable.30
In Vaught v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,3' the plain-
tiff sustained his burden of proof that the original of an
insurance policy issued by the defendant had been lost or
destroyed through no fault of the plaintiff and was per-
mitted to introduce in evidence a photostatic copy of the
policy. The plaintiff sustained this burden of proof by
calling as a witness the president of the insured, who was
not a party to the case, and soliciting from him testimony to
the effect that he did not know where the original policy
was, that the photostatic copy was true and correct, and that
the insured had paid the premiums on the policy.
B. Parol Evidence
In Carolina Ceramics, Inc. v. Carolina Pipeline Co.,32 the
court held that the trial judge had erred in holding that a
price escalation clause in a natural gas contract was clear
and unambiguous. The disputed provision of the contract
was as follows:
In the event that the Commodity Charge for gas
as purchased by Seller from Transcontinental Gas
Pipeline Company is increased above or decreased
below 24.0 cents per MCF, or the Commodity Charge
for gas as purchased by Seller from the Southern
Natural Gas Company is increased above or de-
creased below 18.5 cents per MCF, the amount of
such increases or decreases shall be added to or sub-
tracted from, as the case may be, the price of gas
to Buyer as set forth herein.33
The pipeline company received its natural gas from Trans-
continental from the beginning of its operations in March
of 1958 until October of 1961 when Southern also became a
supplier of the pipeline company. On the day before Southern
became a supplier, the pipeline company informed the ce-
ramics company that the charge for gas would be increased
30. Wynn v. Coney 232 S.C. 346, 102 S.E.2d 209 (1958); Beaty & Co.
v. Southern Ry., 80 W.C. 527, 61 S.E. 1006 (1908); Hunter v. Hunter, 63
S.C. 78, 41 S.E. 33 (1902); J. DREnER, supra note 8, at 50.
31. 250 S.C. 65, 156 S.E.2d 627 (1967).
32. 161 S.E.2d 179 (S.C. 1968).
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because of an increase in commodity charge from Southern.
Before this time the price had been based on the Transcon-
tinental commodity charge which had not changed at the
time of this increase. The ceramics company brought this
action to recover alleged overpayments because of the addi-
tional charge which they alleged was not authorized nor
warranted by the contract. The supreme court held that the
above quoted provision was ambiguous, presumably because
it did not contain any guidelines to be used in determining
whether to use the Transcontinental charge or the Southern
charge in setting the rates to Carolina Ceramics. Since the
provision was held to be ambiguous, parol evidence should
have been admitted to show its true meaning.34
VI. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. American In-
surance Co.,35 the jury was asked to decide if a father who
was driving his son's automobile at the time that he was in-
volved in an accident had his son's express or implied consent
to operate the automobile. The action was brought to deter-
mine if the son's insurance carrier would have to defend and
pay any damages which might be awarded in a suit brought
by the occupants and owner of the other automobile involved
in the wreck. If it was determined that the father did not
have his son's consent, the insurer of the other car would
have to defend and respond in damages under the uninsured
motorist endorsement of its policy.
All the direct evidence, in the form of testimony by the
father and the son, indicated that the father did not have
the son's consent. However, the jury found that the father
was operating the vehicle with his son's express or implied
consent. The son's insurer appealed contending that "the
testimony of the father and the son completely refutes implied
consent to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences." 86
In response to this the supreme court said: "Any fact in
issue may be proved by circumstantial evidence as well as
direct evidence, and circumstantial evidence is just as good
34. Proffitt v. Sitton, 244 S.C. 206, 136 S.E.2d 257 (1964); Spencer v.
Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 317, 133 S.E.2d 826 (1963) ; Charles
v. B. & B. Theatres, 234 S.C. 15, 106 S.E.2d 455 (1959) ; J. DREHER, supra
note 8, at 55.
35. 159 S.E.2d 921 (S.C. 1968).
36. Id. at 923.
1968]
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as direct evidence if it is equally as convincing to the trier of
facts."8 17 The court concluded that it could not say as a
matter of law that the evidence excluded all other reasonable
inferences; therefore, the verdict of the lower court was af-
firmed.88
VII. DAMAGES
The interrelated and complicated nature of the evidence
questions in the important case of Powers v. Temple39 re-
quires a general discussion of that case. This was a guest
passenger suit in which the passenger, in consideration of
the payment of $6,500.00, had executed a covenant not to sue
the driver of the other vehicle involved in the collision. Evi-
dence of the covenant and its amount was brought out during
the course of the trial.
The court conceded that this was a case of first impression
in South Carolina, but based on its review of authority40 in
this area, concluded that "the rule is almost universally fol-
lowed that one tort feasor is entitled to credit for the amount
paid by another tort feasor for a covenant not to sue."1
41
The court also decided that the preferable method for giving
the credit was to exclude evidence of the covenant from the
jury and let the court give the credit after a verdict is ren-
dered. But the fact that this preferable procedure was not
followed in the instant case was not held to be prejudicial
error because the plaintiff, at the time of the trial, sought
to avoid the giving of this credit to the defendant.
The court also held that the trial judge committed error,
but not reversible error, in not allowing the plaintiff to show
that the workmen's compensation carrier, from whom she
had received benefits, had received the proceeds of the cove-
nant not to sue. Although evidence as to workmen's compen-
sation is normally not admissible in an action in tort brought
to recover damages, 42 the court said that it should have been
37. Id.
38. Although the court did not cite any South Carolina decisions to sup-
port its holding, its position is consistent with previous South Carolina
cases. Marks v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 212 S.C. 502, 48 S.E.2d
45 (1948);McCready v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 212 S.C. 449, 48 S.E.2d
193, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 827 (1948).
39. 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759 (1967).
40. Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 352 (1964).
41. Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 155, 156 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1967).
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admitted here for the purpose of showing that the plaintiff
did not personally receive the proceeds of the covenant and
because workmen's compensation was first brought to the
attention of the jury by the defendant in an unsuccessful at-
tempt to elicit evidence as to the amount of benefits paid to
the plaintiff thereunder.
The court also held that the trial judge clearly erred in
allowing the defendant to bring out on cross-examination of
the plaintiff that she had continued to receive her salary
at the rate of $400.00 per month for eleven months during her
disability. While admitting that there was some authority to
support the trial judge, the court concluded that the great
weight of authority was to the contrary.48 It was urged
upon the court that this error as to the plaintiff's salary
was not prejudicial since it bore only on the measure of dam-
ages and the jury had found for the defendant on the issue
of liability. However, the court refused to accept this, saying
that the question of liability appeared to be closely con-
tested and that as a matter of common knowledge in closely
contested cases, "the verdict of the jury is not infrequently
the result of a compromise of varying viewpoints.144 The
court reasoned that the jury in returning a verdict for the
defendant might well have concluded that the plaintiff had
already been substantially compensated for her injuries and
that, if this were the case, the erroneously admitted evidence
could have, in fact, prejudiced the plaintiff's case.45
VIII. DUE PROCESS AS APPLIED IN THE FIELD OF EVIDENCE
A. Administrative Hearings
The South Carolina Supreme Court held in Spartanburg v.
Parris46 that the Civil Service Commission, in conducting a
43. Amnot., 7 A.L.R.3d 516 (1966). The court quoted the following sen-
tence from this annotation on The Collateral Source Rule: "As a general
rule, total or partial compensation for an injury which the injured party
receives from a collateral source wholly independent of the wrongdoer does
not operate to lessen the damages recoverable from the wrongdoer." Id. at
518.
44. Powers v. Temple, 250 S.C. 149, 160, 156 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1967).
45. Chief Justice Moss strongly took issue with this holding in his dis-
senting opinion. He said that on the question of liability in this guest pas-
senger case the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict in his favor
had a proper and timely motion therefor been made. He further said that
because of the defendant's lack of liability, as found by the jury, any error
in the admission of testimony which related solely to the measure or
quantum of damages, e.g., as to the plaintiff's compensation from a col-
lateral source, was immaterial. Id. at 165-70, 156 S.E.2d at 767.
46. 161 S.E.2d 228 (S.C. 1968).
19683
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss4/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
hearing to determine if the discharge of a police officer was
proper, could not receive in evidence against the officer an
affidavit which had been executed by his chief accuser, one
Honeycutt. The court said that the officer would be deprived
of substantial rights if this testimony was admitted without
giving the officer the opportunity to be confronted by and to
cross-examine the chief witness against him.
The court reiterated previous South Carolina decisions
47
in saying that when an administrative and quasi-judicial body
conducts a hearing it is not bound by the strict rules of evi-
dence which a judicial court must follow. But the court
said that this freedom from strict compliance with the rules
of evidence must not be carried so far that a party is deprived
of his substantial rights. Administrative hearings such as
the one in the present case must be "conducted consistently
with fundamental principles which inhere in due process of
law." 48 The fact that the right to cross-examine witnesses
is a fundamental one is well supported by the authorities
quoted by the court in Parris:
The right to cross-examine witnesses in quasi-ju-
dicial or adjudicatory proceedings is a right of
fundamental importance which, in regard to serious
matters, exists even in the absence of express statu-
tory provision, as a requirement of due process of
law or the right to a hearing, and no one may be de-
prived of such right even in an area in which the




In State v. Nelson50 and State v. Ladd,51 the court held
that testimony concerning line-up indentifications of the
defendants was admissible. The trials of these cases were
held before the United States Supreme Court's decision that
47. Richards v. Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955); Jacoby
v. South Carolina State Bd. of Naturopathic Examiners, 219 S.C. 66, 64
S.E.2d 138 (1951).
48. Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Voris, 190 F.2d 275, 277 (5th Cir. 1951).
49. Spartanburg v. Parris, 161 S.E.2d 228, 229 (S.C. 1968), quoting
from 2 Am. Jun. 2d Administrative Law § 424 (1962).
50. 250 S.C. 6 156 S.E.2d 341 (1967).
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line-up identification is a critical stage of the prosecution,
requiring the presence of counsel, unless intelligently waived.52
The Supreme Court on that same day decided that this doc-
trine would not be applied retroactively,5 a thus exempting
these two cases from that requirement. However, the doctrine
will apply to all future cases thus making these two state
cases of little value as precedent in this area.
Nelson involved voice as well as sight identification and
testimony as to this was also held properly admitted. A
positive sight identification was made before any words were
spoken by the suspects, and then nothing which they said at
the time of the crime was used. The court held that the
procedure was not "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive
to irreparable mistaken identification 54 and in fact afforded
no opportunity for suggestion.
C. Self-Incrimination - Scientific Evidence
In State v. Bell,55 testimony as to comparisons made of hairs
removed from the victim's clothing with specimens of the
defendant's hair was held not to be a violation of the defend-
ant's right against self-incrimination. The court said that in
this evidence it saw no element of testimonial compulsion.
WILLIAM B. PATRICK, JR.
52. United States v. Wade, 888 U.S. 218 (1967); accord, Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
53. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
54. State v. Nelson, 250 S.C. 6, 11, 156 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1967), quoting
from Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
55. 250 S.C. 37, 156 S.E.2d 313 (1967).
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